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Suppose	  that	  you	  look	  out	  around	  you	  and	  see	  four	  things:	  a	  human	  being,	  a	  fish,	  a	  toaster,	  and	  a	  
printer	  cartridge.	  Looking	  at	  these	  four	  things,	  you	  might	  be	  able	  to	  detect	  all	  sorts	  of	  similarities	  and	  
differences,	  but	  there	  is	  one	  distinction	  here	  that	  seems	  especially	  noticeable.	  Some	  of	  these	  things	  
have	  minds,	  while	  others	  do	  not.	  One	  would	  attribute	  a	  mind	  to	  the	  human	  being,	  perhaps	  also	  to	  the	  
fish,	  but	  definitely	  not	  to	  the	  toaster	  or	  the	  printer	  cartridge.	  	  	  
	   This	  distinction	  comes	  so	  naturally	  to	  us	  that	  it	  is	  easy	  just	  to	  take	  it	  for	  granted,	  but	  if	  you	  stop	  
to	  think	  about	  it	  for	  a	  moment,	  it	  begins	  to	  seem	  deeply	  puzzling.	  How	  exactly	  do	  people	  decide	  which	  
things	  have	  minds	  and	  which	  do	  not?	  Most	  of	  us	  don’t	  have	  much	  background	  in	  experimental	  
psychology,	  cognitive	  neuroscience	  or	  any	  of	  the	  scientific	  disciplines	  that	  might	  be	  relevant	  to	  a	  
question	  like	  this	  one.	  Yet,	  somehow	  if	  we	  see	  a	  fish	  swimming	  in	  the	  pond	  and	  then	  see	  a	  toaster	  
popping	  up	  some	  toast,	  we	  immediately	  have	  the	  intuition	  that	  the	  former	  might	  have	  certain	  
psychological	  states	  but	  that	  the	  latter	  most	  definitely	  does	  not.	  	  How	  might	  we	  be	  doing	  this?	  	  
	   One	  traditional	  answer	  says	  that	  the	  process	  is	  relatively	  straightforward.	  We	  figure	  out	  whether	  
something	  has	  a	  mind	  by	  checking	  to	  see	  what	  it	  does.	  On	  this	  view,	  the	  key	  thing	  to	  notice	  about	  fish	  is	  
that	  we	  can	  see	  them	  swimming	  around	  and	  responding	  to	  their	  environments	  in	  complex	  ways.	  
Meanwhile,	  the	  toaster	  never	  seems	  to	  do	  anything	  interesting	  —	  all	  it	  ever	  does	  is	  make	  toast.	  So	  an	  
obvious	  hypothesis	  would	  be	  that	  it	  is	  this	  difference	  in	  behavior	  that	  leads	  us	  to	  say	  that	  fish	  have	  
minds	  while	  the	  toaster	  does	  not.	  	  
	   It	  would	  be	  hard	  to	  deny	  that	  this	  hypothesis	  has	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  intuitive	  appeal.	  There	  is	  
something	  that	  seems	  deeply	  right	  about	  the	  idea	  that	  we	  attribute	  minds	  to	  objects	  based	  on	  their	  
behavior,	  and	  philosophers	  have	  developed	  complex	  conceptual	  frameworks	  that	  spell	  this	  idea	  out	  in	  
sophisticated	  detail.	  Such	  frameworks	  typically	  say	  that	  our	  ordinary	  way	  of	  thinking	  about	  the	  mind	  is	  
something	  like	  a	  scientific	  theory.	  Just	  as	  a	  physicist	  might	  make	  sense	  of	  scientific	  observations	  by	  
positing	  unseen	  entities,	  people	  make	  sense	  of	  each	  other’s	  behavior	  by	  positing	  unseen	  mental	  states.	  
The	  only	  difference	  is	  that	  the	  physicist	  explains	  his	  or	  her	  data	  in	  terms	  of	  purely	  physical	  factors	  
(forces,	  particles,	  fields)	  while	  ordinary	  people	  explain	  behavior	  in	  terms	  of	  psychological	  factors	  (beliefs,	  
intentions,	  emotions).	  	  
	   Yet,	  though	  the	  intuitive	  appeal	  of	  this	  framework	  is	  undeniable,	  it	  has	  recently	  come	  up	  against	  
a	  challenge	  from	  a	  somewhat	  unexpected	  source.	  A	  group	  of	  people	  working	  in	  philosophy	  departments	  
began	  thinking	  that	  it	  might	  be	  time	  to	  leave	  their	  armchairs	  and	  go	  out	  to	  conduct	  some	  systematic	  
experimental	  studies.	  These	  ‘experimental	  philosophers’	  were	  particularly	  interested	  in	  the	  traditional	  
philosophical	  view	  that	  people’s	  ordinary	  way	  of	  making	  sense	  of	  the	  world	  might	  be	  something	  like	  a	  
scientific	  theory,	  and	  they	  therefore	  set	  off	  to	  put	  this	  claim	  to	  the	  test	  empirically.	  But,	  surprisingly,	  the	  
experimental	  results	  did	  not	  end	  up	  conforming	  to	  the	  traditional	  view.	  Again	  and	  again,	  the	  results	  
seemed	  to	  show	  that	  people’s	  ordinary	  way	  of	  making	  sense	  of	  the	  world	  was	  radically	  different	  from	  
anything	  we	  might	  expect	  to	  find	  in	  a	  purely	  scientific	  theory.	  	  
The	  issues	  here	  can	  be	  quite	  complex,	  but	  let	  us	  focus	  for	  the	  moment	  on	  just	  one	  aspect	  of	  the	  
problem.	  People’s	  intuitions	  about	  whether	  a	  given	  entity	  has	  a	  mind	  do	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  based	  entirely	  
on	  a	  scientific	  attempt	  to	  explain	  that	  entity’s	  behavior.	  Instead,	  these	  intuitions	  seem	  to	  be	  influenced	  
in	  a	  quite	  striking	  way	  by	  questions	  about	  whether	  that	  entity	  has	  the	  right	  sort	  of	  body.	  	  
	  
Mind	  without	  Body	  
	   If	  we	  want	  to	  get	  to	  the	  bottom	  of	  these	  questions,	  a	  natural	  place	  to	  start	  out	  is	  by	  looking	  for	  
an	  entity	  that	  has	  a	  human-­‐like	  pattern	  of	  behavior	  but	  that	  doesn’t	  have	  any	  kind	  of	  body.	  We	  need	  to	  
find	  an	  entity	  that	  takes	  in	  information	  from	  the	  environment	  and	  uses	  this	  information	  in	  a	  complex	  
way	  to	  attain	  goals.	  However,	  we	  also	  need	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  the	  entity	  does	  not	  have	  anything	  like	  a	  
biological	  body	  in	  the	  familiar	  sense.	  	  
	   Fortunately,	  we	  can	  easily	  find	  an	  entity	  that	  meets	  these	  requirements:	  the	  modern	  
corporation.	  There	  is	  a	  clear	  sense	  in	  which	  corporations	  have	  goals,	  take	  in	  information,	  plan	  
accordingly.	  But	  corporations	  do	  not	  have	  biological	  bodies.	  Instead	  of	  being	  made	  up	  of	  a	  head,	  torso	  
and	  limbs,	  they	  are	  made	  up	  of	  a	  complex	  hierarchy	  of	  departments	  and	  committees.	  	  So	  perhaps	  
corporations	  can	  serve	  as	  a	  helpful	  case	  study	  for	  present	  purposes.	  	  	  	  	  
But	  now	  things	  begin	  to	  get	  interesting.	  The	  first	  thing	  to	  notice	  is	  that	  people	  do	  sometimes	  use	  
sentences	  that	  seem	  to	  ascribe	  mental	  states	  to	  a	  corporation.	  For	  example,	  a	  person	  might	  say:	  	  
• Acme	  Corp.	  intends	  to	  release	  a	  new	  product	  in	  July.	  
Now,	  one	  might	  initially	  suppose	  that	  sentences	  like	  these	  are	  just	  metaphors	  or	  loose	  talk	  and	  that	  
people	  aren’t	  actually	  thinking	  that	  these	  corporations	  can	  literally	  having	  anything	  like	  an	  intention.	  But	  
the	  experimental	  evidence	  suggests	  things	  might	  be	  a	  little	  bit	  more	  complex.	  	  In	  a	  recent	  neuroimaging	  
study,	  I	  collaborated	  with	  the	  psychologists	  Anna	  Jenkins,	  David	  Dodell-­‐Feder	  and	  Rebecca	  Saxe	  to	  look	  
at	  the	  patterns	  of	  brain	  activation	  observed	  when	  people	  read	  sentences	  like	  these.	  It	  turns	  out	  that	  
people	  reading	  such	  sentences	  show	  activation	  in	  the	  very	  same	  brain	  regions	  that	  have	  been	  
traditionally	  associated	  with	  thinking	  about	  other	  minds	  (particularly	  the	  right	  temporoparietal	  junction,	  
which	  seems	  to	  be	  highly	  selective	  for	  thinking	  about	  beliefs	  and	  intentions).	  	  
	   So	  suppose	  we	  assume	  for	  the	  moment	  that	  people	  actually	  are	  ascribing	  mental	  states	  to	  
corporations.	  We	  now	  come	  to	  the	  crux	  of	  the	  issue.	  If	  people	  think	  that	  a	  corporation	  can	  have	  some	  
kind	  of	  mind,	  what	  sort	  of	  mind	  do	  they	  think	  it	  can	  have?	  Do	  people	  conceive	  of	  a	  corporation	  as	  having	  
the	  same	  sort	  of	  mind	  we	  might	  find	  in	  a	  human	  being	  or	  an	  animal,	  or	  do	  they	  think	  that	  there	  is	  
something	  important	  that	  a	  corporation	  is	  missing?	  To	  get	  at	  these	  questions,	  I	  teamed	  up	  with	  the	  
philosopher	  Jesse	  Prinz	  and	  ran	  a	  series	  of	  studies.	  	  
	   What	  we	  found	  was	  that	  people	  showed	  a	  systematic	  tendency	  to	  see	  corporations	  as	  having	  
only	  one	  highly	  delimited	  aspect	  of	  a	  normal	  mind.	  In	  particular,	  people	  were	  happy	  to	  agree	  with	  
sentences	  like	  these:	  	  
• Acme	  Corporation	  believes	  that	  its	  profit	  margin	  will	  soon	  increase.	  
• Acme	  Corporation	  intends	  to	  release	  a	  new	  product	  this	  January.	  
• Acme	  Corporation	  wants	  to	  change	  its	  corporate	  image.	  
But	  suppose	  we	  then	  shift	  over	  to	  sentences	  that	  ascribe	  to	  a	  corporation	  some	  kind	  of	  feeling	  or	  
experience.	  For	  example:	  	  
• Acme	  Corporation	  is	  now	  experiencing	  great	  joy.	  
• Acme	  Corporation	  is	  getting	  depressed.	  
• Acme	  Corporation	  is	  feeling	  upset.	  	  
People	  regarded	  these	  sentences	  as	  completely	  wrong,	  sometimes	  laughably	  so.	  In	  other	  words,	  people	  
seem	  to	  think	  that	  corporations	  are	  capable	  of	  deciding,	  intending,	  knowing,	  and	  so	  on,	  but	  that	  they	  
are	  not	  capable	  of	  truly	  feeling	  or	  experiencing	  anything.	  In	  the	  jargon	  of	  philosophy,	  corporations	  are	  
regarded	  as	  utterly	  lacking	  in	  phenomenal	  consciousness.	  	  
	   Here	  again,	  we	  seem	  to	  be	  faced	  with	  a	  result	  that	  initially	  seems	  perfectly	  natural	  and	  obvious	  
but	  begins	  to	  look	  more	  and	  more	  puzzling	  as	  one	  examines	  it	  further.	  Why	  exactly	  can’t	  a	  corporation	  
feel	  upset?	  A	  corporation	  can	  certainly	  behave	  in	  ways	  that	  would	  be	  characteristic	  of	  feeling	  upset,	  yet	  
one	  somehow	  gets	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  corporation	  wouldn’t	  truly	  be	  feeling	  anything	  at	  all.	  How	  do	  we	  
arrive	  at	  this	  intuition?	  One	  possible	  answer	  is	  that	  people	  don’t	  think	  that	  corporations	  can	  have	  
consciousness	  because	  corporations	  don’t	  have	  the	  right	  sorts	  of	  bodies.	  	  
	  
Minds	  and	  Machines	  
	   But,	  of	  course,	  we	  will	  never	  be	  able	  to	  isolate	  the	  role	  of	  the	  body	  if	  we	  just	  restrict	  our	  
attention	  to	  corporations.	  	  Corporations	  differ	  from	  human	  beings	  in	  numerous	  respects,	  and	  any	  of	  
these	  differences	  could	  be	  explaining	  the	  observed	  effects.	  	  What	  we	  really	  need,	  then,	  is	  an	  entity	  that	  
is	  almost	  exactly	  the	  same	  as	  a	  human	  being	  except	  that	  it	  lacks	  a	  biological	  body.	  	  	  
	   The	  philosopher	  Bryce	  Huebner	  came	  up	  with	  the	  perfect	  way	  to	  fulfill	  these	  requirements.	  	  He	  
conducted	  a	  series	  of	  studies	  in	  which	  participants	  were	  asked	  to	  imagine	  a	  robot	  that	  has	  been	  
designed	  to	  act	  like	  a	  person.	  	  Although	  the	  robot	  is	  presumably	  made	  of	  silicon	  and	  metal,	  it	  is	  
described	  as	  behaving	  exactly	  like	  a	  human	  being	  on	  all	  possible	  psychological	  tests.	  	  The	  question	  now	  
is	  what	  sorts	  of	  mental	  states	  people	  will	  be	  willing	  to	  ascribe	  to	  it.	  	  	  
	   Strikingly,	  the	  answer	  is	  that	  people	  ascribe	  to	  the	  robot	  exactly	  the	  same	  sorts	  of	  states	  that	  
they	  are	  willing	  to	  ascribe	  to	  a	  corporation.	  	  They	  are	  happy	  to	  say:	   
• It	  believes	  that	  triangles	  have	  three	  sides.	  
But	  they	  are	  unwilling	  to	  say:	  	  
• It	  feels	  happy	  when	  it	  gets	  what	  it	  wants.	  
In	  other	  words,	  what	  we	  see	  arising	  here	  is	  exactly	  the	  same	  asymmetry	  we	  observed	  for	  intuitions	  
about	  corporations.	  	  Once	  again,	  people	  are	  describing	  an	  entity	  without	  a	  biological	  body	  as	  having	  an	  
ability	  to	  have	  states	  like	  beliefs	  but	  not	  as	  having	  a	  capacity	  for	  genuine	  feeling	  or	  experience.	  	  	  
	   But	  notice	  what	  is	  happening	  this	  time.	  	  The	  robot	  is	  described	  as	  behaving	  exactly	  like	  a	  human	  
being	  in	  all	  situations.	  	  So	  any	  difference	  between	  the	  mental	  states	  we	  ascribe	  to	  it	  and	  the	  mental	  
states	  we	  ascribe	  to	  a	  human	  being	  can’t	  be	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  an	  attempt	  to	  predict	  behavior.	  	  It	  
must	  be	  that	  the	  body	  is	  playing	  some	  role	  here.	  	  Something	  about	  the	  presence	  of	  our	  faces,	  our	  flesh,	  
our	  biological	  nature	  must	  be	  triggering	  people	  to	  think	  that	  we	  have	  phenomenal	  consciousness.	  	  	  
	  
Mind	  and	  Flesh	  
	   Thus	  far,	  we	  have	  been	  considering	  cases	  in	  which	  an	  entity	  is	  seen	  as	  not	  having	  a	  body.	  	  But	  
suppose	  we	  now	  go	  in	  the	  opposite	  direction.	  Suppose	  we	  find	  a	  case	  in	  which	  an	  entity	  is	  seen	  as	  
especially	  embodied,	  a	  case	  in	  which	  we	  associate	  this	  entity	  with	  a	  body	  even	  more	  than	  we	  would	  in	  
cases	  of	  ordinary	  human	  interaction.	  What	  sort	  of	  mind	  would	  they	  ascribe	  in	  a	  case	  like	  that?	  	  
	   I	  was	  discussing	  this	  question	  one	  day	  with	  the	  psychologist	  Kurt	  Gray	  when	  someone	  happened	  
to	  overhear	  us	  and	  suggested	  an	  interesting	  new	  approach.	  It	  turned	  out	  that	  there	  was	  a	  recently	  
published	  photography	  book	  in	  which	  each	  model	  was	  depicted	  in	  different	  stages	  of	  undress.	  This	  fact	  
alone	  may	  seem	  a	  bit	  unsurprising,	  but	  in	  this	  particular	  case,	  the	  book	  was	  composed	  in	  a	  particularly	  
systematic	  way.	  For	  each	  of	  the	  models,	  there	  was	  a	  completely	  clothed	  photograph	  and	  then,	  on	  the	  
facing	  page,	  a	  photograph	  of	  the	  same	  person,	  in	  the	  same	  position,	  with	  the	  same	  facial	  expression,	  
only	  this	  time	  completely	  naked.	  It	  was	  a	  cognitive	  scientist’s	  dream,	  the	  artistic	  equivalent	  of	  a	  perfectly	  
controlled	  study.	  We	  immediately	  decided	  to	  go	  ahead	  and	  run	  a	  new	  experiment,	  with	  the	  pictures	  
from	  this	  book	  as	  stimulus	  materials.	  	  
	   In	  collaboration	  with	  our	  colleagues	  Paul	  Bloom,	  Mark	  Sheskin	  and	  Lisa	  Feldman	  Barrett,	  we	  put	  
together	  the	  experimental	  design.	  Each	  participant	  would	  receive	  a	  photograph	  and	  then	  would	  be	  
asked	  to	  guess,	  just	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  that	  one	  photograph,	  how	  much	  the	  model	  depicted	  was	  capable	  of	  
having	  various	  different	  mental	  states.	  	  So	  a	  participant	  might	  be	  asked:	  	  
• Compared	  to	  the	  average	  person,	  how	  much	  is	  Erin	  capable	  of	  self-­‐control?	  
• Compared	  to	  the	  average	  person,	  how	  much	  is	  Erin	  capable	  of	  feeling	  fear?	  
• Compared	  to	  the	  average	  person,	  how	  much	  is	  Erin	  capable	  of	  planning?	  
But,	  of	  course,	  the	  stimuli	  were	  designed	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  let	  us	  look	  systematically	  at	  the	  
relationships	  between	  different	  variables.	  	  The	  questions	  asked	  both	  about	  ordinary	  non-­‐phenomenal	  
states	  (self-­‐control,	  planning)	  and	  about	  states	  that	  involved	  phenomenal	  consciousness	  (feeling	  fear,	  
feeling	  pleasure).	  	  And	  each	  participant	  was	  randomly	  assigned	  to	  receive	  either	  a	  picture	  of	  a	  clothed	  
model	  or	  a	  picture	  of	  a	  naked	  model.	  	  	  
	   Before	  I	  tell	  you	  the	  results,	  let’s	  take	  just	  a	  moment	  to	  consider	  the	  different	  predictions	  one	  
might	  make	  in	  a	  case	  like	  this.	  	  One	  obvious	  prediction	  would	  be	  that	  showing	  the	  model	  naked	  would	  
make	  her	  vulnerable	  to	  a	  kind	  of	  ‘objectification.’	  	  Participants	  might	  come	  to	  think	  of	  her	  more	  as	  a	  
physical	  object,	  a	  mere	  thing,	  and	  they	  might	  therefore	  be	  less	  inclined	  to	  see	  her	  as	  having	  mental	  
states.	  	  But	  then	  again,	  we	  can	  also	  imagine	  another	  sort	  of	  prediction,	  going	  in	  a	  quite	  different	  
direction.	  Perhaps	  there	  is	  something	  about	  an	  awareness	  of	  the	  body	  that	  makes	  people	  more	  inclined	  
to	  ascribe	  phenomenal	  consciousness.	  So	  the	  effect	  might	  actually	  end	  up	  going	  the	  opposite	  way.	  A	  
focus	  on	  the	  body	  could	  make	  participants	  more	  inclined	  to	  think	  in	  terms	  of	  feelings	  and	  experiences.	  	  
	   With	  these	  predictions	  in	  mind,	  we	  can	  now	  turn	  to	  the	  actual	  results.	  	  For	  the	  non-­‐phenomenal	  
states,	  we	  ended	  up	  finding	  exactly	  what	  one	  would	  expect.	  The	  more	  salient	  a	  person’s	  body	  was	  
made,	  the	  less	  inclined	  participants	  were	  to	  ascribe	  these	  states.	  In	  other	  words,	  if	  you	  want	  people	  to	  
take	  you	  as	  someone	  capable	  of	  complex	  planning	  and	  self-­‐control,	  your	  best	  bet	  is	  not	  to	  have	  these	  
people	  looking	  at	  pictures	  of	  you	  naked.	  	  No	  surprises	  there.	  This	  is	  exactly	  the	  point	  that	  has	  been	  made	  
repeatedly,	  and	  with	  great	  sophistication,	  in	  existing	  work	  within	  feminist	  theory.	  
	   But	  now	  comes	  the	  surprising	  part.	  For	  the	  phenomenal	  states,	  we	  did	  not	  find	  this	  same	  
pattern.	  In	  fact,	  we	  found	  just	  the	  opposite.	  When	  the	  model	  was	  depicted	  naked,	  people	  were	  actually	  
more	  inclined	  to	  think	  that	  she	  was	  capable	  of	  having	  feelings	  and	  experiences.	  	  They	  were	  more	  
inclined	  to	  think	  she	  was	  capable	  of	  feeling	  fear,	  more	  inclined	  to	  think	  she	  was	  capable	  of	  feeling	  
pleasure.	  	  In	  fact,	  on	  all	  the	  different	  measures	  we	  used,	  we	  always	  found	  that	  making	  the	  body	  more	  
salient	  made	  people	  more	  inclined	  to	  ascribe	  feelings.	  
	   But	  the	  effect	  does	  not	  stop	  there.	  Gray	  has	  tested	  this	  same	  basic	  hypothesis	  using	  a	  whole	  
series	  of	  imaginative	  experimental	  techniques.	  	  He	  has	  given	  participants	  information	  about	  a	  person’s	  
blood	  type,	  asked	  them	  to	  judge	  a	  person’s	  physical	  attractiveness,	  even	  shown	  them	  pornographic	  
images.	  Always,	  the	  result	  is	  the	  same.	  The	  more	  one	  makes	  participants	  focus	  on	  the	  body,	  the	  more	  
they	  tend	  to	  ascribe	  feelings	  and	  experiences.	  	  
	   All	  in	  all,	  then,	  it	  does	  not	  appear	  that	  these	  phenomena	  are	  best	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  
notion	  of	  ‘objectification.’	  	  It	  is	  not	  as	  though	  participants	  are	  coming	  to	  think	  of	  a	  person	  as	  being	  a	  
mere	  object,	  like	  a	  toaster	  or	  a	  printer	  cartridge.	  	  Rather,	  what	  we	  see	  emerging	  is	  a	  more	  complex	  
pattern.	  Participants	  are	  thinking	  of	  the	  person	  as	  having	  less	  of	  one	  part	  of	  the	  mind	  but	  more	  of	  
another.	  	  So	  perhaps	  it	  would	  be	  better	  to	  say	  that	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  body	  leaves	  us	  thinking	  of	  the	  person	  
as	  an	  animal.	  That	  is,	  it	  leads	  us	  to	  think	  of	  the	  person	  as	  having	  more	  of	  the	  part	  of	  the	  mind	  we	  
associate	  with	  animals	  (fear,	  pleasure,	  pain)	  and	  less	  of	  the	  part	  we	  regard	  as	  distinctively	  human	  
(complex	  reasoning,	  planning,	  self-­‐control).	  
	  
Perceiving	  the	  Mind	  	  
	   With	  all	  this	  experimental	  evidence	  on	  the	  table,	  we	  can	  now	  return	  to	  our	  original	  question.	  	  
We	  wanted	  to	  get	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  process	  people	  use	  to	  figure	  out	  which	  entities	  have	  
minds	  and	  which	  do	  not.	  	  So	  what	  exactly	  is	  this	  experimental	  evidence	  telling	  us?	  	  	  
	   The	  answer	  may	  come	  as	  a	  surprise.	  The	  key	  message	  coming	  out	  of	  the	  experimental	  evidence	  
seems	  to	  be	  that	  the	  whole	  question	  was	  a	  mistaken	  one.	  It	  is	  beginning	  to	  look	  like	  we	  might	  have	  been	  
wrong	  to	  go	  searching	  for	  something	  like	  ‘the	  process	  people	  use	  to	  figure	  out	  which	  entities	  have	  
minds.’	  The	  trouble	  is	  that	  there	  just	  doesn’t	  seem	  to	  be	  any	  single	  unified	  process	  that	  fits	  the	  bill.	  
Instead,	  there	  appear	  to	  be	  two	  distinct	  processes	  here	  –	  one	  for	  figuring	  out	  whether	  an	  entity	  is	  
capable	  of	  having	  states	  like	  beliefs	  and	  goals,	  another	  for	  figuring	  out	  whether	  an	  entity	  is	  capable	  of	  
genuine	  feelings.	  If	  we	  really	  want	  to	  get	  to	  the	  bottom	  of	  these	  issues,	  we	  will	  have	  to	  address	  each	  of	  
these	  processes	  separately.	  	  	  
But	  when	  the	  question	  is	  reformulated	  in	  this	  way,	  a	  new	  answer	  becomes	  possible.	  We	  might	  
discover	  that	  people’s	  understanding	  of	  beliefs	  and	  goals	  involves	  something	  like	  a	  quasi-­‐scientific	  
attempt	  to	  explain	  human	  behavior,	  but	  we	  should	  not	  immediately	  assume	  that	  the	  same	  holds	  for	  
people’s	  understanding	  of	  feelings	  and	  experiences.	  	  On	  the	  contrary,	  all	  the	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  this	  
latter	  process	  is	  deeply	  different.	  	  Our	  ordinary	  attributions	  of	  phenomenal	  consciousness	  do	  not	  appear	  
to	  be	  based	  entirely	  on	  behavior;	  they	  do	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  purely	  scientific;	  they	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  serve	  
primarily	  to	  aid	  prediction	  or	  explanation.	  Above	  all,	  they	  seem	  to	  be	  wrapped	  up	  in	  some	  fundamental	  
way	  with	  an	  awareness	  of	  the	  body.	  
	  
	  
	  	  
